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BOOK REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION. By Kenneth F. Ripple. Charlottesville:
The Michie Company. 1984. Pp. xxii, 674. $50.00.
Reviewed by Francis X. Beytagh, Jr. *
"Government by lawsuit" is the striking phrase used by the late
Justice Robert H. Jackson in describing the process of constitu-
tional litigation.' That this process plays a vital role in shaping the
resolution of many of this country's important policy questions has
been evident at least since Marbury v. Madison.2 It is thus ironic, and
indeed a bit mystifying, that constitutional litigation-as a discrete
subject independent of either constitutional law or litigation in gen-
eral-has received little in the way of focused attention from com-
mentators. Happily, Professor (now Judge) Ripple's recently
published book moves significantly in the direction of remedying
this deficiency.
Persons reading and reviewing books take differing views on
the worth of the preface. Some dwell on the author's introductory
words, while others seem to ignore them. When a publication
breaks new ground, as Ripple's does, one should at least seek to
discuss the objectives the author had in mind in writing the book.
Ripple straightforwardly states, in his Preface, that the book "is
principally designed to assist the practicing attorney who, con-
fronted with a constitutional issue, realizes that a different litigation
approach is necessary if the issue is to be presented effectively and
if he is to enhance the probability of eventual Supreme Court re-
view" (p. xix). In my judgment, that is a laudable, if modest, goal.
Two decades of experience in litigating constitutional questions as
well as teaching seminars in constitutional litigation have per-
suaded me of our systemic shortcomings in this unique and crucial
field. Competence in handling constitutional cases not only bene-
fits an attorney's client but assists the courts in dealing more effec-
tively with such matters, and thus inures to the benefit of the public
generally. The process of deciding constitutional questions is not
limited to the courts alone, but, as Professor Paul A. Freund aptly
observed, involves "judge and company." 3 Ripple understands this
only too well and, in "suggest[ing] an approach to litigating the
* Cullen Professor of Law, University of Houston; Coauthor, P. KAUPER & F. BEYTAGH,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 1980).
1 R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 286 (1941).
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3 P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 145 (1949).
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constitutional case" (p. xx), identifies and seeks to address an im-
portant need of our legal system.
In his' early chapters, contained in a unit entitled "The Basic
Characteristics of Constitutional Litigation," Ripple sets out to es-
tablish that constitutional litigation possesses special features that
distinguish it from "other forms of civil litigation" (p. 1). Perhaps
in this regard, the author protests a bit too much. Constitutional
litigation is at once unique yet not dissimilar from litigation in gen-
eral. In contrast to the situation in some western democracies, the
American judicial systems (federal and state) entertain cases
presenting both constitutional and nonconstitutional questions.
We have no "constitutional courts," yet in a real sense all of our
courts qualify as such. This adds to the complexity of a lawyer's
task in handling cases presenting constitutional questions. It is in
this practical respect-the differences in consequences for attor-
neys involved with such cases-that Ripple's distinctions are most
telling. He recognizes this and, although the effort seems some-
what labored and concededly possesses "a certain theoretical qual-
ity" (p. 1), his message comes through. Whether a busy
practitioner will bear with the 136 pages Ripple uses to do this is
another matter.
Although the chapters addressing the characterization of con-
stitutional issues (chapter 1), constitutional and adjudicative facts
(chapter 2), and justiciability (chapter 3), are informative, emphasis
might have been placed not only on why constitutional litigation is
different in some respects from ordinary litigation, but also on what
the resulting practical consequences are to litigators. More specifi-
cally, chapter 3 seems out of place and is probably unnecessary.
Justiciability issues are not unique to constitutional litigation. But
they may, as Ripple notes, play a special role in this context in view
of judicially developed prudential doctrines for avoiding constitu-
tional decisionmaking. And, of course, subject matter jurisdiction
is in any event a necessary predicate to justiciability issues, although
not in terms mentioned by the author. More pertinently, though,
justiciability-related concepts are simply too complex to be ex-
amined in a limited number of pages. As a consequence, the dis-
cussion tends to be oversimplified and possibly misleading to
novices in this court-created thicket. It might have been preferable
simply to refer the reader to the various texts on federal jurisdiction
and like sources.
At the risk of elaborating the obvious, a more logical place to
begin this whole discussion would seem to be with "recognition" of
constitutional issues in the first instance, instead of with "character-
ization" of such questions. Perhaps it is safe to assume that practi-
tioners will ordinarily have a sufficient sensitivity to the possible
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presence of a constitutional issue in a given factual pattern that rec-
ognition can safely be taken for granted. Unfortunately, this may
not always be so. This is not intended to suggest that Ripple's dis-
cussion of characterization is not helpful. In particular, the "case
studies" included in chapter 1 not only illustrate the complexity of
characterization in the constitutional litigation but also provide
some valuable lessons in that regard. In a similar vein, Ripple's
analysis of developing and handling adjudicative and constitutional
facts in chapter 2 is illuminating, as is his treatment of the NAACP's
litigation strategy in the area of school desegregation (contained in
the short chapter 4), leading up to the overruling of the "separate
but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson4 in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.5 Some may have difficulty applying the lessons of that monu-
mental constitutional crusade to the typically less cosmic issues that
run-of-the-mill constitutional cases present. Nonetheless, the in-
sights are interesting and valuable ones, especially with regard to
the Court's perspective, including cases "not actually before it" (p.
123), as it shapes and develops constitutional doctrine.
Chapters 5 through 10 constitute what Professor Ripple re-
gards as the second "unit" of the book-a section he entitles "Put-
ting the Case Together." In a number of important respects, these
chapters are the heart of the book and predictably will prove to be
of great value to practitioners seeking assistance in handling the
occasional constitutional case that may come their way. Ripple's
introductory notes set the tone for the entire section and are worth
quoting. Constitutional law, he writes, "is not made solely in the
Supreme Court of the United States; it is the product of the entire
litigation process which progressively refines the judicial focus on
the constitutional values at issue in the case" (p. 137). I suspect
that experienced litigators are aware of this, but inexperienced
ones-and many legal academics who help to shape prospective liti-
gators' attitudes toward constitutional law-may not be.
Chapter 5 deals with "the choice between federal and state
courts," a topic that is infrequently addressed in a thorough and
thoughtful way. Ripple's key point is that "the choice between [the
federal or the state forum] ought to be a reasoned and deliberate
one based not on generalities, but on a careful appraisal as to how
the particular case in question would be treated in each forum" (p.
139). And he then proceeds, in an interesting and insightful man-
ner, to spell out and discuss the various factors that should be con-
sidered in making such an appraisal. His critical assessment of the
"conventional wisdom" of federal courts' superiority in dealing
4 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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with constitutional questions is especially pertinent, and sheds con-
siderable light on an increasingly important matter that has thus far
received rather limited attention. He notes that in a number of in-
stances a litigant cannot, for a variety of reasons, choose between a
federal or state forum (as, for example, in criminal cases, or be-
cause of some statutory or federally mandated policy favoring one
court system over the other). But in those situations where a choice
exists, Ripple writes, the conventional wisdom regarding the com-
parative competence of federal and state court judges and with re-
spect to perceived institutional differences should not be followed
blindly. "[M]ajor institutional changes have taken place in state ju-
diciaries throughout the country" (p. 146), he notes, and "the sup-
posedly greater receptivity of the federal judiciary to constitutional
issues is also questionable-at least as a general proposition" (p.
147). Ripple may overstate the case for state courts somewhat, but
the overall point he makes is well-taken. Lawyers should not
thoughtlessly file every case potentially presenting federal constitu-
tional issues in a federal court, for, in some instances at least, a
state court may be a more available and congenial forum for such
litigation. But Ripple might have added that state court judges are
still elected in a number of states, and are thus less likely to deal
aggressively with controversial and potentially unpopular positions.
And, as with federal courts, state court competence will clearly vary
from one state to another, and even from one court to another
within a particular state. Ripple's treatment is nonetheless effective
and perceptive, especially in dealing with the question of remedies
and with the increasing availability of a state constitution as a basis for
protecting what historically have been viewed as federal constitu-
tional rights. Pragmatic considerations such as docket load might
have warranted more attention, but on the whole, the chapter con-
stitutes an exceptionally fine treatment of an important and timely
topic that warrants the attention of both experienced and fledgling
litigators.
Ripple returns to "threshold problems of justiciability" in
chapter 6. What he says about this complex subject is necessarily
tied to the earlier discussion in chapter 3, but is more practical in its
thrust. Especially useful is his delineation of "lessons" for the prac-
titioner regarding justiciability and related matters. One might
quibble a bit with his treatment of the doctrine of standing, but the
overall discussion is successful and is likely to be of considerably
more interest to the busy practitioner than the earlier, theoretical
consideration of the subject. They might profitably have been com-
bined in a single chapter.
Chapter 7, dealing with "issue development and the problem
of characterization," is one of the most interesting and useful chap-
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ters in the entire book. As noted earlier, the "issue spotting" to
which Ripple makes passing references is an aspect of recognition
which, at least to my way of thinking, logically precedes characteri-
zation of a constitutional question. Ripple acknowledges that alter-
native or complementary characterization "is a tough balancing act
for the constitutional litigator" (p. 225), but suggests that this still
may be desirable in some situations in view of the uncertainty that
may exist about the decisionmaker's reaction and disposition in
given circumstances, the impact of other issues pending in the same
(or even other) courts, and the like. Ripple deserves a loud hurrah
for noting that litigators too frequently overlook the benefits to be
derived from a comparative law assessment, especially when the
constitutional issue presented is one which constitutional courts in
countries with systems similar to ours (for example, Germany, Ja-
pan, Canada, Italy, and Ireland) may previously have examined.
More frequent reference by lawyers to foreign constitutional cases
might go a long way toward stimulating American courts to over-
come their traditional provincialism in this regard. As Ripple aptly
notes, the widespread ignorance in this country of major constitu-
tional developments in a growing number of western democracies
during the post-World War II era is a lamentable defect that needs
correcting.
In like vein, Ripple's discussion of supporting the litigator's
characterization of his case with "constitutional facts" is illuminat-
ing and insightful. This, he says, is "basically an educative task" (p.
233). Of special value is his insistence that thorough development
of the record at trial is usually preferable to reliance on a "Brandeis
brief" on appeal, once the record has been irrevocably determined.
He includes helpful examples of pretrial development of the rec-
ord, along with the supporting reasons. And his discussion of the
"ghost of past cases" (p. 255)-the judiciary's tendency to rely on
stereotypes in various areas of constitutional litigation-is deserv-
ing of thoughtful attention, as is his admonition to avoid the poten-
tial for "overkill" through overbroad characterization of the issue
or exaggeration of the supporting facts. The appendices included
at the end of the chapter contain illustrative examples, taken from
actual cases, of the effective presentation of constitutional and adju-
dicative facts.
In chapter 8 Ripple deals with the important matter of "think-
ing ahead" to the question of remedies as one shapes litigation
presenting constitutional issues. Again, it is a useful and effective
discussion. His consideration of federalism concerns is especially
valuable, as is his emphasis on the litigator's responsibility in this
regard. "[T]he framing of the remedy is too important," he writes,
"for counsel to leave it to the court alone" (p. 307). His treatment
[Vol. 60:816
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of "institutional litigation" is very worthwhile, in particular his sug-
gestions regarding drafting and implementing the sought-for de-
cree. His analysis of the possible immunities which defendants in
constitutional cases might claim is sound and thorough, with the
leading cases of recent years effectively considered and summa-
rized. The chapter concludes with a perceptive discussion of the
thorny matter of the retroactivity or prospectivity of law-changing
decisions, along with analysis of case law under the Civil Rights At-
torneys' Fee Awards Act of 1976, an item of no little interest to
lawyers litigating in the federal courts.
In chapter 9 attention is shifted to the appellate process, more
specifically the "intermediate appeal." Ripple aptly describes the
contrasts between trial and appellate courts, insofar as the "litiga-
tion ambience" of the two is concerned. Recent changes affecting
how appellate courts function are discussed. Valuable practical
suggestions are included, such as the influential effect of the trial
court's opinion, the importance of stating the "question presented"
effectively, the need for dealing "forthrightly and completely" with
threshold questions relating to jurisdiction and justiciability, and
the often overlooked importance of the "summary of argument"
contained in the appellate brief. Some mention of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and their counterparts in state inter-
mediate appellate courts, might have been included.
Chapter 10 seems to involve some backtracking on the author's
part, as it peruses on the matter of "treating the federal question in
the state case," a logical companion to the discussion in chapter 5
and, in any event, something that seemingly should precede rather
than follow consideration of the intermediate appeal. That organi-
zational query aside, the chapter contains a helpful analysis of a dif-
ficult and important topic. Ripple reminds the litigator to ensure
that the "case or controversy" requirement of article III is satisfied
because a state court case presenting a federal constitutional ques-
tion might eventually work its way into the United States Supreme
Court, where that jurisdictional prerequisite, along with other fed-
eral court concerns relating to justiciability, would become perti-
nent. His suggestions as to the "when" and "how" of raising the
federal question in state court litigation, and then of preserving it,
are very helpful. His discussion of the "final judgment" rule, and in
particular the slippery notion of "practical finality," is effective but
perhaps a bit labored. He includes a valuable quotation from the
court's recent decision in Michigan v. Long,6 clarifying and to some
extent changing the approach toward the "adequate and indepen-
dent" state law ground of decision. Overall, the treatment of the
6 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
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special factors involved in state court consideration of federal ques-
tions, and in turn in Supreme Court review of state court cases, is
sensibly included and effectively presented.
The final "unit" of Professor Ripple's book deals with the spe-
cific subject of handling constitutional litigation in the Supreme
Court. Chapter 11 provides an effective introduction to this unique
governmental institution. Ripple emphasizes that, because of its
decisive role in the constitutional litigation process, the Court views
such issues "from a perspective distinctly different from that of
other courts" (p. 430). The Court is a "continuing institution" with
a refined sense of its institutional capacity, a body with a "special
kind of intellectual environment" (p. 431), he tells us. Ripple also
focuses on the Court's "workload" problem, and discusses the im-
pact of this phenomenon (and the Justices' perception thereof) on
the Court's case-screening and decisional processes. He also elabo-
rates on "some special members of the cast" (p. 440-50), discussing
the office of the ChiefJustice, the role of the Solicitor General, and
the work of the Justices' law clerks-all matters about which those
handling cases in the Court should be adequately informed. Ripple
does a fine job of providing a capsule look at each of these, in an
informing but not overly simplistic way. The short chapter is well
worth reading for anyone dealing with or interested in knowing
how "judge and company," 7 again to use Professor Freund's apt
phrase, operate.
Chapter 12 addresses the Court's "screening function." Rip-
ple first considers the distinction between appeal and certiorari
cases, under the pertinent congressional statutes and the applicable
Supreme Court rules. He notes that, while a higher percentage of
appeal cases are given plenary review, the supposedly distinct cate-
gories of cases are in fact treated similarly by the Court (though the
"nomenclature" of the papers filed and actions taken differ signifi-
cantly). The Court's "internal machinery" for handling cases is ef-
fectively treated, as is what Ripple terms the "overall litigation
ambience" in the Supreme Court. His list of "specific guidelines"
for litigators seeking to persuade the Court to give plenary consid-
eration to a case filed with it is thorough and insightful. He might
have added that, because about only one-fourth of the cases that
come to the Court are in fact discussed by the Justices at a Court
conference, the first challenge for the litigator is getting over that
initial hurdle. Ripple aptly labels the "court below" as the "new
party" in a case filed in the Supreme Court (p. 466), but he could
have elaborated more extensively on the crucial importance of
lower court opinions in the Justices' and law clerks' screening
7 See note 3 supra.
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processes. Not infrequently, these materials are consulted first, and
they may leave an indelible impression. The "real opposition," as
Ripple notes, is in fact "all the other cases that vie for the Court's
attention" (p. 467). Why this issue and why now are both vital ques-
tions for the litigator to answer convincingly, he points out. Ripple
correctly underscores the importance of carefully drafting and se-
lecting the "question presented" as stated in the certiorari petition
or jurisdictional statement. He also includes an insightful analysis
of ways in which counsel can make a given case as attractive to the
Court as possible. At the risk of nitpicking, Ripple might have
noted that, more frequently than not, the Court grants plenary re-
view to reverse the decision below (and that counsel should be
aware of the consequences of this), and that the Court decides a
significant number of cases summarily (on the merits, but without
briefing or oral argument so that counsel should attempt to include
enough in the initial papers filed to at least avoid bringing a case in
this fashion). Ripple also notes that lawyers seeking to convince the
Court to grant plenary consideration on the basis of a conflict be-
tween circuit courts of appeals are more likely to succeed if they
have obtained (or at least sought) an en banc decision from the
court of appeals that decided the case in question. Indeed, a con-
flict between two or more en banc decisions is an even more likely
candidate for receiving the Court's attention.
In chapter 13 Ripple discusses the Court's plenary review of
the constitutional case. After some introductory consideration of
the "very special setting" which the Court constitutes, he deals at
considerable (perhaps excessive) length with the Court's use of his-
tory in considering constitutional questions, giving specific exam-
ples from various recent cases. He also includes a useful
assessment of the Court's attitude toward the doctrine of stare deci-
sis, but says little about the consequences for handling constitu-
tional litigation. With respect to the brief on the merits, Ripple
soundly focuses on the importance of providing the Court with suf-
ficient information about the facts and law underlying the case, and
includes helpful suggestions about approach and technique. More
emphasis might have been placed on the importance of the "sum-
mary of argument" section of an appellate brief, which in the
Supreme Court sometimes provides the Justices with their first (and
perhaps lasting) impression of the litigator's position and which
often is consulted to refresh recollection as the oral argument be-
gins. And Ripple might have noted the subtle differences between
"topside" and "bottomside" briefs-and, similarly, oral arguments.
More specifically, counsel should realize, especially in the Supreme
Court, that a bottomside approach should at once be self-contained
yet responsive, and requires a great deal of spontaneity and flexibil-
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ity. Ripple's discussion of oral argument is very sound and in-
sightful. Perhaps he could have emphasized how crucial time will
predictably be, especially in a complex case, and that counsel might
help himself in this regard by outlining his argument at the outset
and by attempting to anticipate as many questions as possible (and
being prepared to answer them, of course). Passing mention of
when and how to use rebuttal time might have been included as
well. Overall, the chapter is a very useful summary of most of the
key notions associated with this large and complex subject, one
treated at length elsewhere, such as in the Stern and Gressman "bi-
ble" for Supreme Court practitioners. 8 One small disappointment
was Ripple's omission of any reference to John W. Davis's classic
article on Supreme Court advocacy.9 It should be required reading
for anyone handling cases in the Court, and has lost little of its
value with the passage of forty-five years since it was first published.
The two remaining chapters seem more like afterthoughts than
integral parts of the book. Chapter 14 relates to the amicus curiae
participation in Supreme Court litigation. Ripple's categorization
of the varying roles played by amici is interesting. And his analysis
with regard to agreeing to or opposing amicus involvement is
sound. Some attention could have been given to the specific re-
quirements of the Supreme Court rules regarding amicus participa-
tion, as well as to amici as important sources of information for the
court in certain types of cases, where the issues are complex and the
parties might, for one reason or another, not illuminate the ques-
tions sufficiently. Inclusion of a final chapter on the "chambers
practice" of individual Justices, in particular with regard to stay ap-
plications, seems at most peripheral to the gristmill of constitu-
tional litigation. As a consequence, the book ends more with a
whimper than a bang, but Ripple presumably had his reasons for
the chapter's inclusion. His analysis of the factors considered by
Justices in deciding whether to grant stays is interesting and, at
least in certain constitutional cases, may be of some value to the
litigator. As an aside, one might add, if such a chapter is thought to
be needed, it should at least mention the utility (and versatility) of
the litigator's "best friend" in a federal court-the so-called All-
Writs Act, now contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Ripple might well
consider combining the amicus curiae discussion with material con-
tained in an earlier chapter, and shifting the essentials of chapter 15
(regarding chambers practice) to an appendix, in the next edition
of his otherwise fine book.
8 R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (5th ed. 1978).
9 Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895 (1940); see also Jackson, Advocacy
Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations, 37 A.B.A.J. 801, 861 (1951).
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The several appendices contain "Research Tips in Constitu-
tional Law" (a very valuable listing of pertinent source materials,
from which U.S. Law Week is, perhaps inadvertently, omitted), "Se-
lected Extra-Judicial Writings of the Justices" (a veritable lodestar
for the constitutional litigator and Court-watcher), "Chambers
Opinions of Justices Currently Sitting" on the Court (without any
explanation as to why these are included, and how they might be
useful to the litigator), "Selected Sections of the Federal Judicial
Code" (since the book is not limited to litigation in the Supreme
Court, jurisdictional and similar statutes relating to the federal dis-
trict courts and circuit courts of appeals might have also been in-
cluded), and finally, "Selected Rules of the Supreme Court."10
To my knowledge no one has ever attempted anything of the
magnitude of Professor Ripple's book in this oft-neglected field.
Such a work has been long overdue, and it is a tribute to Ripple's
extensive experience with constitutional litigation and his care and
precision as a scholar that this pioneering effort is of such a high
quality. If war is too important to be left to the generals, then con-
stitutional litigation is too important to be left to the litigators-
often ones not adequately equipped to represent their clients effec-
tively, much less assist the courts in resolving such crucial matters
in an informed and consistent fashion. And it is the public, and the
policies reflected in judicial decisions that affect the public, that suf-
fer when constitutional litigation is not handled well. Minor omis-
sions and several organizational quirks aside, Ripple has written a
very useful and insightful book on an important subject. But, one
might hope, he has done more than that. He has initiated a dia-
logue on this topic that will not only assist the practitioner, but will
influence the courts (and maybe even the law schools) as well. Be-
yond that, one also might hope, he has legitimized an area of the
law that heretofore was not looked at coherently or comprehen-
sively. All of us who care about how constitutional issues are dealt
with are in his debt.
10 Ripple includes a bibliography organized on a chapter-by-chapter basis and also pro-
vides extensive footnotes at the end of each chapter, which provide the reader with valuable
sources supportive of the preceding discussion.
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